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ABSTRACT
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere
choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the ob-
jects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks
one object among those that remain. Another intuitive way to ob-
tain an allocation is to give objects to agents in the rst place, and to
let agents exchange them as long as such “deals” are benecial. This
paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive pref-
erences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between
them, and with other eciency and fairness notions. In particular,
we show that an allocation is sequenceable if and only if it is opti-
mal for a certain type of deals, namely cycle deals involving a single
object. Furthermore, any Pareto-optimal allocation is sequenceable,
but not the converse. Regarding fairness, we show that an allocation
can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive
equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. To complete the
picture, we show how some domain restrictions may aect the
relations between these notions. Finally, we experimentally explore
the links between the scales of eciency and fairness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate fair division of indivisible goods. In
this problem, a set of indivisible objects or goods has to be allocated
to a set of agents, taking into account the agents’ preferences about
the objects. This classical collective decision making problem has
plenty of practical applications, among which the allocation of
space resources [9, 30], of tasks to workers in crowdsourcingmarket
systems [34], papers to reviewers [26] or courses to students [19].
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019,
Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
This problem can be tackled from two dierent perspectives.
The rst possibility is to resort to a benevolent entity in charge
of collecting in a centralized way the preferences of all the agents.
This entity then computes an allocation that takes into account
these preferences and satises some fairness (e.g. envy-freeness)
and eciency (e.g. Pareto-optimality) criteria, or optimizes a well-
chosen social welfare ordering. The second possibility is to have a
distributed point of view, e.g. by starting from an initial allocation
and letting the agents negotiate to swap their objects [23, 35]. A
somewhat intermediate approach consists in allocating the objects
to the agents using a protocol, which allows to build an allocation
interactively by asking the agents a sequence of questions. Proto-
cols are at the heart of works mainly concerning the allocation of
divisible resources (cake-cutting) [16], but have also been studied
in the context of indivisible goods [14, 16].
In this paper, we focus on a particular allocation protocol: se-
quences of sincere choices (also known as picking sequences). This
very simple protocol works as follows. A central authority chooses
a sequence of agents before the protocol starts, having as many
agents as the number of objects (some agents may appear several
times in the sequence). Then, each agent appearing in the sequence
is asked to choose in turn one object among those that remain. For
instance, according to the sequence 〈1, 2, 2, 1〉, agent 1 will choose
rst, then agent 2will pick two objects in a row, and agent 1will take
the last object. This protocol, used in a lot of everyday situations,
has been studied for the rst time by Kohler and Chandrasekaran
[29]. Later, Brams and Taylor [17] have studied a particular ver-
sion of this protocol, namely alternating sequences, in which the
sequence of agents is restricted to a balanced (〈1, 2, 2, 1...〉) or strict
(〈1, 2, 1, 2...〉) alternation of agents. Bouveret and Lang [11] have
further formalized this protocol, whose properties (especially re-
lated to game theoretic aspects) have later been characterized by
Kalinowski et al. [27, 28]. Finally, Aziz et al. [4] have studied the
complexity of problems related to nding whether a particular as-
signment (or bundle) is achievable by a particular class of picking
sequences. Picking sequences have also been considered by Brams
and King [15], that focus on a situation where the agents have
ordinal preferences. They make an interesting link between this
protocol and Pareto-optimality, showing, among others, that pick-
ing sequences always result in a Pareto-optimal allocation, but also
that every Pareto-optimal allocation can be obtained in this way.
In this paper, we elaborate on these ideas and analyze the links
between sequences, certain types of deals among agents, and some
eciency and fairness properties, in a more general model in which
the agents have numerical additive preferences on the objects. Our
main contributions are the following. We give a formalization of
the link between allocations and sequences of sincere choices, high-
lighting a simple characterization of the sequenceability of an allo-
cation (Section 3). Then, we show that in this slightly more general
framework than the one by Brams and King, Pareto-optimality
and sequenceability are not equivalent anymore (Section 4). By
unveiling the connection between sequenceability and cycle deals
among agents (Section 5), we obtain a rich “scale of eciency”
that allows us to characterize the degree of eciency of a given
allocation. Interestingly, some domain restrictions have signicant
eects on this hierarchy (Section 6). We also highlight (Section 7) a
link between sequenceability and another important economical
concept: the competitive equilibrium from equal income (CEEI).
Another contribution is the experimental exploration of the links
between the scale of eciency and fairness properties (Section 8).
2 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
The aim of the fair division of indivisible goods, also called Mul-
tiAgent Resource Allocation (MARA), is to allocate a nite set of
objects O = {o1, . . . ,om } to a nite set of agents N = {1, . . . ,n}.
A sub-allocation on O′ ⊆ O is a vector −→pi |O′ = 〈pi |O′1 , . . . ,pi |O
′
n 〉
of bundles of objects, such that ∀i,∀j with i , j : pi |O′i ∩ pi |O
′
j = ∅
(a given object cannot be allocated to more than one agent) and⋃
i ∈N pi
|O′
i = O′ (all the objects from O′ are allocated). pi |O
′
i ⊆ O′
is called agent i’s share on O′. −→pi |O′′ is a sub-allocation of −→pi |O′
when pi |O
′′
i ⊆ pi |O
′
i for each agent i . Any sub-allocation
−→pi |O on
the entire set of objects will be written −→pi and just called allocation.
Any satisfactory allocation must take into account the agents’
preferences on the objects. Here, we will make the classical assump-
tion that these preferences are numerically additive. Each agent
i has a utility function ui : 2O → R+ measuring her satisfaction
ui (pi ) when she obtains share pi , which is dened as follows:
ui (pi ) def=
∑
ok ∈pi
w(i,ok ),
where w(i,ok ) is the weight given by agent i to object ok . This
assumption, as restrictive as it may seem, is made by a lot of authors
[8, 31, for instance] and is considered a good compromise between
expressivity and conciseness.
Denition 2.1. An instance of the additive multiagent resource
allocation problem (add-MARA instance) is a tuple I = 〈N ,O,w〉,
where N and O are as dened above and w : N × O → R+ is a
mapping. Here,w(i,ok ) is the weight given by agent i to object ok .
We say that the agents’ preferences are strict on objects if, for
each agent i and each pair of objects ok , ol , we have w(i,ok ) ,
w(i,ol ). Similarly, we say that the agents’ preferences are strict on
shares if, for each agent i and each pair of shares pi , pi ′, we have
ui (pi ) , ui (pi ′). Note that strict preferences on shares entail strict
preferences on objects; the converse is false.
We will denote by P(I ) the set of allocations for I . We will also
use the notation oioj ... as a shorthand for bundle {oi ,oj , ...}.
Denition 2.2. Given an agent i and a set of objects O′, we will
write best(O′, i) = argmaxok ∈O′ w(i,ok ) the objects from O′ hav-
ing the highest weight for i (they will be called top objects of i).
A (sub-)allocation −→pi |O′ is said frustrating if no agent receives
one of her top objects in −→pi |O′ (formally: best(O′, i) ∩ −→pi |O′i = ∅ for
each agent i), and non-frustrating otherwise.
In the following, we will consider a particular way of allocating
objects to agents: sequences of sincere choices.
Denition 2.3. Let I = 〈N ,O,w〉 be an add-MARA instance. A
sequence of sincere choices (or simply sequence when the context is
clear) is a vector of Nm . We will denote by S(I ) the set of possible
sequences for the instance I .
Let −→σ ∈ S(I ) be a sequence of agents and let σt be the t th agent
of the sequence. −→σ is said to generate allocation −→pi if and only if−→pi can be obtained as a possible result of the non-deterministic1
Algorithm 1 on input I and −→σ .
Algorithm 1: Execution of a sequence
Input: an instance I = 〈N ,O,w〉 and a sequence −→σ ∈ S(I )
Output: an allocation −→pi ∈ P(I )
1 −→pi ← empty allocation (such that ∀i ∈ N : pii = ∅);
2 O1 ← O;
3 for t from 1 tom do
4 i ← σt ;
5 choose object ot ∈ best(Ot , i) ;
6 pii ← pii ∪ {ot } ;
7 Ot+1 ← Ot \ {ot }
Denition 2.4. An allocation −→pi is said to be sequenceable if there
exists a sequence −→σ that generates −→pi , and non-sequenceable other-
wise. For a given instance I , we will write s(I ) the binary relation
dened by (−→σ ,−→pi ) ∈ s(I ) if and only if −→pi can be generated by −→σ .
Example 2.5. Let I be the instance represented by the following
weight matrix:2 (
8 2 1
5 1 5
)
For instance, sequence 〈2, 1, 2〉 generates two possible alloca-
tions: 〈o1,o2o3〉 and 〈o2,o1o3〉, depending onwhether agent 2 chooses
object o1 or o3 that she both prefers. Allocation 〈o1o2,o3〉 can be
generated by three sequences. Allocations 〈o1o3,o2〉 and 〈o3,o1o2〉
are non-sequenceable.
For any instance I , |S(I )| = |P(I )| = nm . Also note that the
number of objects allocated to an agent by a sequence is the number
of times the agent appears in the sequence.
The notion of frustrating allocation and sequenceability were
already implicitly present in the work by Brams and King [15], and
sequenceability has been extensively studied by Aziz et al. [4] with a
focus on sub-classes of sequences (e.g. alternating sequences). How-
ever, a fundamental dierence is that in our setting, the preferences
1The algorithm contains an instruction choose splitting the control ow into several
branches, building all the allocations generated by −→σ .
2In this example and the following ones, we represent instances by a matrix where
the value at row i and column ok represents the weightw (i, ok ).
might be non strict on objects, which entails that the same sequence
can yield dierent allocations (in the worst case, an exponential
number), as Example 2.5 shows.
3 SEQUENCEABLE ALLOCATIONS
We have seen in Example 2.5 that some allocations are non-sequen-
ceable. We will now formalize this and give a precise characteri-
zation of sequenceable allocations. That is, we will try to identify
under which conditions an allocation is achievable by the execution
of a sequence of sincere choices. We rst start by noticing that in
every sequenceable allocation, the rst agent of the sequence gets
a top object, so every frustrating allocation is non-sequenceable.
However, being non-frustrating is not a sucient condition for an
allocation to be sequenceable, as the following example shows:
Example 3.1. Consider this instance:(
9 8 2 1
2 5 1 4
)
In allocation −→pi = 〈o1o4,o2o3〉, each agent receives her top object.
However, after o1 and o2 have been allocated (they must be allo-
cated rst by all sequences generating −→pi ), the dotted sub-allocation
remains. This sub-allocation is obviously non-sequenceable because
it is frustrating. Hence −→pi is not sequenceable either.
This property of containing a frustrating sub-allocation exactly
characterizes the set of non-sequenceable allocations:
Proposition 1. Let I = 〈N ,O,w〉 be an instance and −→pi be an al-
location of this instance. The two following statements are equivalent:
(A) −→pi is sequenceable.
(B) No sub-allocation of −→pi is frustrating (in every sub-allocation,
at least one agent receives a top object).
Proof. (B)⇒ (A). Let us suppose that for all subsets of objects
O′ ⊆ O, at least one agent gets one of her top objects in −→pi |O′ . We
will show that −→pi is sequenceable. Let −→σ be a sequence of agents and−→O ∈
(
2O
)m
be a sequence of bundles jointly dened as follows:
• O1 = O and σ1 is an agent that receives one of her top
objects in −→pi |O1 ;
• Ot+1 = Ot \{ot }, where ot ∈ best(Ot ,σt ) and σt is an agent
that receives one of her top objects in −→pi |Ot , for t ≥ 1.
From the assumption on −→pi , we can check that −→σ is well-dened.
Moreover, −→pi is one of the allocations generated by −→σ .
(A) ⇒ (B) by contraposition. Let −→pi be an allocation contain-
ing a frustrating sub-allocation −→pi |O′ . Suppose that there exists a
sequence −→σ generating −→pi . We can notice that in a sequence of
sincere choices, when an object is allocated to an agent, all the
objects that are strictly better for her have already been allocated at
a previous step. Let ok ∈ O′, and let i be the agent that receives ok
in −→pi . Since −→pi |O′ is frustrating, there is another object ol ∈ O′ such
thatw(i,ol ) > w(i,ok ). As we have seen, ol is necessarily allocated
before ok in the execution of −→σ . Let j be the agent who receives
ol . Using the same argument for j and ol we nd another object
op ∈ O′ allocated before ol in the sequence. Iterating this argument,
since O′ is nite, we will eventually nd an object which has been
encountered before. This creates a cycle in the precedence relation
of the objects in the execution of the sequence. Contradiction: no
sequence can thus generate −→pi . 
Besides characterizing a sequenceable allocation, the proof of
Proposition 1 gives a practical way of checking if an allocation is
sequenceable, and, if it is the case, of computing a sequence that
generates this allocation.
Proposition 2. Let I = 〈N ,O,w〉 be an instance and −→pi be an
allocation of this instance. We can decide in time O(n ×m2) if −→pi is
sequenceable.
The proof is based on the execution of Algorithm 2. This algo-
rithm is similar in spirit to the one proposed by Brams and King [15]
but is more general because (i) it can involve non-strict preferences
on objects, and (ii) it can conclude with non-sequenceability.
Algorithm 2: Sequencing an allocation
Input: I = 〈N ,O,w〉 and −→pi ∈ P(I )
Output: a sequence −→σ generating −→pi or NonSeq
1 (−→σ ,O′) ← (〈〉,O);
2 for t from 1 tom do
3 if ∃i such that best(O′, i) ∩ pii , ∅ then
4 Append i to −→σ ;
5 let ok ∈ best(O′, i) ∩ pii ;
6 O′ ← O′ \ {ok };
7 else return NonSeq ;
8 return −→σ ;
Proof. We show that Algorithm 2 returns a sequence −→σ gen-
erating the input allocation −→pi if and only if there is one. Suppose
that the algorithm returns a sequence −→σ . Then, by denition of the
sequence (in the loop from line 2 to line 7), at each step t , i = σt can
choose an object in pii , that is one of her top objects. Conversely,
suppose the algorithm returns NonSeq. Then, at a given step t , ∀i ,
best(O′, i) ∩ pii = ∅. By denition, −→pi |O
′
is therefore, at this step, a
frustrating sub-allocation of −→pi . By Proposition 1, −→pi is thus non-
sequenceable. The loop from line 2 to line 7 runs in time O(n ×m),
because searching for the top objects in the preferences of each
agent can be completed in time O(m). This loop being executedm
times, the algorithm runs in O(n ×m2). 
4 PARETO-OPTIMALITY
An allocation is Pareto-optimal if no other allocation dominates
it. In our context, allocation −→pi ′ dominates allocation −→pi if for all
agent i , ui (pi ′i ) ≥ ui (pii ) and uj (pi ′j ) > uj (pij ) for at least one agent
j. When an allocation is generated from a sequence, in some sense,
a weak form of eciency is applied to build the allocation: each
successive (picking) choice is “locally” optimal. This raises a natural
question: is every sequenceable allocation Pareto-optimal?
This question has already been extensively discussed indepen-
dently by Aziz et al. [3] and Bouveret and Lemaître [13]. We com-
plete the discussion here to give more insights about the implica-
tions of the previous results in our framework.
Brams and King [15, Proposition 1] prove the equivalence be-
tween sequenceability and Pareto-optimality. However, they have
a dierent notion of Pareto-optimality, because the agents’ prefer-
ences are given as linear orders over objects. To be able to compare
bundles, these preferences are lifted on subsets using the responsive
set extension RS . This extension leaves many bundles incompa-
rable and leads to dene possible and necessary Pareto-optimality.
Brams and King’s notion is possible Pareto-optimality. Aziz et al.
[2] show that, given a linear order  on objects and two bundles pi
and pi ′, pi RS pi ′ if and only if u(pi ) > u(pi ′) for all additive utility
functions u compatible with  (that is, such that u(ok ) > u(ol ) if
and only if ok  ol ). This characterization of responsive dominance
yields the following reinterpretation of Brams and King’s result: an
allocation −→pi is sequenceable if and only if for each other allocation−→pi ′, there is a set u1, . . . ,un of additive utility functions, respec-
tively compatible with 1, . . . ,n such that ui (pii ) > ui (pii ′) for at
least one agent i .
The latter notion of Pareto-optimality is very weak, because
(unlike in our context) the set of additive utility functions is not xed
— we just have to nd one that works. Under our stronger notion,
the equivalence between sequenceability and Pareto-optimality no
longer holds.3
Example 4.1. Let us consider the following instance:(
5 4 2
8 2 1
)
The sequence 〈1, 2, 2〉 generates allocation −→pi = 〈o1,o2o3〉 giving
utilities 〈5, 3〉. −→pi is then sequenceable but it is dominated by −→pi ′ =
〈o2o3,o1〉, giving utilities 〈6, 8〉 (and generated by 〈2, 1, 1〉). Observe
that, under ordinal linear preferences, −→pi ′ would not dominate −→pi ,
but they would be incomparable.
The last example shows that a sequence of sincere choices does
not necessarily generate a Pareto-optimal allocation. What about
the converse? We can see, as a trivial corollary of the reinterpreta-
tion of Brams and King’s result in our terminology, that the answer
is positive if the preferences are strict on shares. The following result
is more general, because it holds even without this assumption:
Proposition 3 ([3, 13]). Every Pareto-optimal allocation is se-
quenceable.
As already noticed by Aziz et al. [3], the proof follows from an
adaptation of Brams and King’s Proposition 1 (necessity part of the
proof) [15]. However, we nd useful to give the proof, because it is
more general than the previous one, and will be reused in subse-
quent results of this paper. Before giving this proof, we illustrate it
on a concrete example [12, Example 5].
Example 4.2. Let us consider the following instance:
©­­«
† 12 15 †11 7 2
2 12 7 †15 † 11
15 † 20 9 2 1
ª®®¬
The circled allocation −→pi is not sequenceable: indeed, every se-
quence that could generate it should start with 〈3, 1, . . . 〉, leaving
the frustrating sub-allocation −→ρ in a dotted box.
3Actually, since it is known [1, 21] that testing Pareto-optimality with additive prefer-
ences in coNP-complete, and that testing sequenceability is in P (Proposition 2), they
cannot be equivalent unless P = coNP.
Let us consider agent 1 for instance. Since the suballocation is
frustrating, she does not receive o3 (which is her top object), but
agent 2 does. This latter agent, however, does not get her top object,
o4, because agent 1 receives it. Obviously, if agent 1 gives o4 to
agent 2 and receives o3 in return, we have built a cycle in which
each agent gives a regular object and receives a top one. Doing this,
we have built an allocation strictly dominating −→pi .
Proof. As stated in the example, we will now prove the contra-
position of the proposition: every non-sequenceable allocation is
dominated. Let −→pi be a non-sequenceable allocation. From Proposi-
tion 1, in a non-sequenceable allocation, there is at least one frustra-
tring sub-allocation. Let −→ρ be such a sub-allocation (that can be −→pi
itself). We will, from −→ρ , build another sub-allocation dominating it.
Let us choose an arbitrary agent i involved in −→ρ , receiving an object
not among her top ones in −→ρ . Let oi be a top object of i in −→ρ , and let
j (, i) be the unique agent receiving it in −→ρ . Let oj be a top object
of j . We can notice that oj , oi (otherwise j would obtain one of her
top objects and −→ρ would not be frustrating). Let k be the unique
agent receiving oj in −→ρ , and so on. Using this argument iteratively,
we form a path starting from i and alternating agents and objects,
in which two successive agents and objects are distinct. Since the
number of agents and objects is nite, we will eventually encounter
an agent which has been encountered at a previous step of the path.
Let i be the rst such agent and ok be the last object seen before her
in the sequence (i is the unique agent receiving ok ). We have built
a cycle i
ok−→ k ok−1−→ k − 1 · · · i + 1 oi−→ i in which all the agents and
objects are distinct, and that has at least two agents and two objects.
From this cycle, we can modify −→ρ to build a new sub-allocation by
giving to each agent in the cycle a top object instead of another less
preferred object, all the agents not appearing in the cycle being left
unchanged. More formally, the following attributions in −→ρ (and
hence in −→pi ): (i ← ok )(i + 1← oi ) · · · (k ← ok−1) are replaced by:
(i ← oi )(i + 1← oi+1) · · · (k ← ok ) where (i ← oi ) means that oi
is attributed to i . The same substitutions operated in −→pi yield an
allocation −→pi ′ that dominates −→pi . 
Corollary 4.3. No frustrating allocation can be Pareto-optimal
(equivalently, in every Pareto-optimal allocation, at least one agent
receives a top object).
Proposition 3 implies that there exists, for a given instance, three
classes of allocations: (1) non-sequenceable (therefore non Pareto-
optimal) allocations, (2) sequenceable but non Pareto-optimal al-
locations, and (3) Pareto-optimal (hence sequenceable) allocations.
These three classes dene a “scale of eciency” that can be used
to characterize the allocations. What is interesting and new here
is the intermediate level. We will see that this scale can be further
rened.
5 CYCLE DEALS-OPTIMALITY
Pareto-optimality can be thought as a reallocation of objects among
agents using improving deals [35, 37], as we have seen, to some
extent, in the proof of Proposition 3. Trading cycles or cycle deals
constitute a sub-class of deals, which is classical and used, e.g., by
Varian [39, page 79] and Lipton et al. [31, Lemma 2.2] in the context
of envy-freeness. Trying to link eciency concepts with various
notions of deals is thus a natural idea.
Denition 5.1. Let 〈N ,O,w〉 be an add-MARA instance and −→pi
be an allocation of this instance. A (N ,M)-cycle deal of −→pi is a
sequence of transfers of items µ = 〈(µ1,O1), . . . , (µN ,ON )〉, where,
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, µ j denotes the jth agent involved in the
sequence and µ j ∈ N , Oj ⊆ pij , and |Oj | ≤ M . The allocation−→pi [← µ] resulting from the application of µ to −→pi is dened as
follows:
• pi [← µ]µ j = piµ j \ Oj ∪ Oj−1 for j ∈ {2, . . . ,N };
• pi [← µ]µ1 = piµ1 \ O1 ∪ ON ;
• pi [← µ]i = pii if i < {µ1, . . . , µN }.
A cycle deal 〈(µ1,O1), . . . , (µN ,ON )〉 will be written
µ1
O1−→ µ2 . . . µN−1 ON−1−→ µN ON−→ µ1.
In other words, in a cycle deal (we omit N and M when they
are not necessary to understand the context), each agent gives a
subset of at mostM items from her share to the next agent in the
sequence and receives in return a subset from the previous agent.
(N , 1)-cycle deals will be denoted by N -cycle deals. 2-cycle deals
will be called swap-deals. Among these cycle deals, some are more
interesting: those where each agent improves her utility by trading
objects. More formally, a deal d will be called weakly improving if
ui (pi [← d]i ) ≥ ui (pii ) ∀i ∈ N with at least one of these inequalities
being strict, and strictly improving if all these inequalities are strict.
Intuitively, if it is possible to improve an allocation by apply-
ing an improving cycle deal, then it means that this allocation is
inecient. Reallocating the items according to the deal will make
everyone better-o. It is thus natural to derive a concept of e-
ciency from this notion of cycle-deal.
Denition 5.2. An allocation is said to be >-(N ,M)-cycle optimal
(resp. ≥-(N ,M)-cycle optimal) if it does not admit any strictly (resp.
weakly) improving (K ,M)-cycle deal for any K ≤ N .
We begin with easy observations. First, ≥-cycle optimality im-
plies >-cycle optimality, and these two notions become equivalent
when the preferences are strict on shares. Moreover, restricting the
size of the cycles and the size of the bundles exchanged yield less
possible deals and hence lead to weaker optimality notions.
Note that for N ′ ≤ N andM ′ ≤ M (at least one of these inequal-
ities being strict), >-(N ,M)-cycle-optimality and ≥-(N ′,M ′)-cycle-
optimality are incomparable. These observations show that cycle-
deal optimality notions form a (non-linear) hierarchy of eciency
concepts of diverse strengths. The natural question is whether they
can be related to sequenceability and Pareto-optimality. Obviously,
Pareto-optimality implies both >-cycle-optimality and ≥-cycle-
optimality. An easy adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3 leads
to the following stronger result:
Proposition 4. An allocation −→pi is sequenceable if and only if it
is >-n-cycle optimal (with n = |N |).
Proof. Let −→pi be a non-sequenceable allocation. Then by Propo-
sition 1, there is at least one frustrating sub-allocation in −→pi . Using
the same line of arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3 we
can build a strictly improving k-cycle. Hence −→pi is not >-cycle
optimal. Conversely, suppose that −→pi admits a strictly improving
k-cycle deal. Then obviously this cycle yields a sub-allocation that
is frustrating. 
The scale of eciency introduced in Section 4 can then be rened
with a hierarchy of >-cycle optimality notions below sequenceable
allocations: Pareto-optimal⇒ sequenceable⇔ >-n-cycle optimal
⇒ >-(n − 1)-cycle optimal⇒ ...⇒ >-swap optimal.
As for ≥-cycle optimality, it forms a parallel hierarchy between
Pareto-optimal and non-sequenceable allocations. Note that se-
quenceability does not involve any ≥-n-cycle-optimality. Thus, as
soon as k < n, ≥-k-cycle optimality and sequenceability become
incomparable notions.
For instance, for 3 agents, there exist allocations which are
≥-swap optimal but not sequenceable and the other way around:
©­«
2 †1 2 †3
† 3 3 1 2
1 2 †3 1
ª®¬
Here the circled allocation is ≥-swap optimal, but not sequenceable:
there exists a strictly improving 3-cycle. At the same time, the dag
allocation is sequenceable (by 〈2, 3, 1, 1〉), but not even ≥-swap
optimal, since 1 and 2 may agree on a weakly improving deal.
The observations previously made in this section suggest that,
in some situations, the most complex cycle deals could be required
to reach Pareto-optimal allocations. This is indeed the case–we
now make this claim more precise. Observe that to be involved in a
weakly improving cycle deal, each agent must pass at least one item,
thus for a (n,k)-cycle deal, we have that k ≤ m − (n − 1) (i.e. the
“largest bundle" circulating in this cycle deal can be at mostm−n+1).
The following generic example shows that it may be necessary to
implement a (n,m−n+1)-cycle to reach a Pareto-optimal allocation.
α1 α2 . . . αn−1 β1 . . . βm−n+1
1 1 0 0 0 1/(m− n+ 1) 1/(m− n+ 1) 1/(m− n+ 1)
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
n 0 0 0 2 1/(m− n+ 1) 1/(m− n+ 1) 1/(m− n+ 1)
Initially, every agent i = 1, . . . ,n − 1 holds item αi , while agent
n holds β1, . . . , βm−n+1. Hence everyone enjoys utility 1. This allo-
cation is dominated by the allocation where each agent i = 2, . . . ,n
holds αi−1 while agent 1 holds β1, . . . , βm−n+1. In this allocation,
the utilities of agents are instead 〈1, 1, . . . , 2〉. But to obtain αn−1,
agent n must get it from n − 1 who would only release it if she gets
αi−2, etc. In the end, agent 1 will only release α1 if she gets the full
bundle β1, . . . , βm−n+1. Overall there are n agents involved in the
deal, exchanging up tom − n + 1 items. By construction, it is easy
to check that no simpler cycle deal (either in terms of number of
items or number of agents) would allow to reach this allocation.
Furthermore, there is clearly no other allocation Pareto-dominating
the initial allocation.
However, it is important to note that cycle-deals may not be
sucient to reach Pareto-optimal outcomes when there are more
items than agents.
Example 5.3. Consider the following example:
©­«
3 6 †6 0 6 †4
†2 0 6 3 †7 0
0 †5 0 †4 6 3
ª®¬
Note that in the circled allocation, all agents enjoy the same
utility, 〈9, 9, 9〉, and that it is Pareto-dominated by the dag allocation
which induces the vector of utilities 〈10, 9, 9〉. We leave it to the
reader to check that no swap deal, nor 3-cycle, would be weakly
improving. In fact, the only way to reach the dag allocation from
this initial allocation would require to implement simultaneously
two (3, 1)-cycle deals (1 −→ 2 −→ 3 and 3 −→ 2 −→ 1).
Finally, a corollary of Propositions 2 and 4 is that checking
whether an allocation is >-n-cycle optimal can be made in polyno-
mial time (by checking whether it is sequenceable).
More generally, we can observe that checking whether an alloca-
tion is (k,k ′)-cycle optimal can be done by iterating over all k-uples
of agents4, and for each one iterating over all possible transfers
involving less than k ′ objects. In total, there are k!
(n
k
)
k-uples of
agents (which is upper-bounded by nk+1). For each k-uple, there
are at most
(∑k ′
k ′′=0
(m
k ′′
) ) k
possible transfers, which is again upper-
bounded by (1+m)kk ′ . Hence, in total, checking whether an alloca-
tion is (k,k ′)-cycle optimal can be done in timeO(nk+1×(1+m)kk ′).
This is polynomial in n andm if both k and k ′ are bounded (as for
swap deals).
6 RESTRICTED DOMAINS
We now study the impact of several preference restrictions on the
hierarchy of eciency notions introduced in Section 5.
Strict preferences on objects. When the preferences are strict on
objects, then obviously every sequence generates exactly one allo-
cation. The following proposition is stronger and shows that the
converse is also true:
Proposition 5. Preferences are strict on objects i s(I ) is a map-
ping from S(I ) to P(I ).
Proof. If preferences are strict on objects, each agent has only
one possible choice at her turn in the sequence of sincere choices
and hence every sequence generates one and only one allocation.
Conversely, if preferences are not strict on objects, at least one
agent (suppose w.l.o.g. agent 1) gives the same weight to two dier-
ent objects ok , ol . Suppose that exactly t objects are ranked above
ok and ol . Then the sequence where agent 1 picks t + 1 items in a
row, and 2 picks them − t − 1 remaining ones obviously generates
two allocations, depending on agent 1’s choice at step t + 1. 
Same order preferences. We say that the agents have same order
preferences [12] if there is a permutation η : O 7→ O such that for
each agent i and each pair of objects ok and ol , if η(ok ) < η(ol ) then
w(i,η(ok )) ≥ w(i,η(ol )).
Proposition 6. All the allocations of an instance with same or-
der preferences are sequenceable (and actually cycle-deal optimal).
Conversely, if all the allocations of an instance are sequenceable, then
this instance has same order preferences.
4We do not need to also run through all cycles of strictly less than k agents: such a
cycle can be simulated just by appending at the end some agents whose role is just to
pass the objects they receive to the next agent.
Proof. Suppose that the agents have same order preferences,
and let −→pi be an arbitrary allocation. In every sub-allocation of −→pi at
least one agent obtains a top object (because the preference order
is the same among agents) and hence cannot be frustrating. By
Proposition 1, −→pi is sequenceable.
Conversely, let us assume for contradiction that there are two
distinct objects ok and ol and two distinct agents i and j such
that w(i,ok ) > w(i,ol ) and w(j,ok ) < w(j,ol ). The sub-allocation−→pi | {ok ,ol } such that pi | {ok ,ol }i = {ol } and pi | {ok ,ol }j = {ok } is frus-
trating. By Proposition 1, every allocation −→pi containing this frus-
trating sub-allocation is non-sequenceable. 
Let us now characterize the instances for which s(I ) is a one-to-
one correspondence.
Proposition 7. For a given instance I , the following two state-
ments are equivalent.
(A) Preferences are strict on objects and in the same order.
(B) The relation s(I ) is a one-to-one correspondence.
The proof is a consequence of Propositions 5 and 6.
Single-peaked preferences. An interesting domain restriction are
single-peaked preferences [10, 22], which, beyond voting, is also
relevant in resource allocation settings [6, 20]. Formally, in this
context, single-peakness can be dened as follows.
There exists a linear order . over the set of objects O. Let top(i)
be the preferred object of i . An agent i has single-peaked preferences
wrt. . if, for any two objects (ok ,ol ) ∈ O such that either top(i) .
ol . ok or ok . ol . top(i) (i.e. lying on the same “side” of the agent’s
peak), it is the case that i prefers ol over ok .
Interestingly, when preferences are single-peaked, the hierarchy
of n-cycle optimality collapses at the second level:
Proposition 8. If the preferences are single-peaked and additive,
then an allocation −→pi is ≥-n-cycle optimal i it is swap-optimal.
Proof. ([20, revisited]) First, note that ≥-n-cycle optimality triv-
ially implies swap-optimality. Let us now show the converse.
Let us consider for the sake of contradiction an allocation −→pi
that is swap-optimal and such that there exists a ≥-k-cycle µ,
with k ≤ n. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that µ =
〈(µ1, {o1}) , . . . , (µk , {ok })〉. We show by induction on k , the length
of µ, that such a cycle can not exist.
Base case: k = 2 A 1-cycle of length k = 2 is a swap-deal but
as −→pi is swap-optimal, no improving swap-deal exists in −→pi hence
the contradiction.
Induction step: Let us assume that for each k ′ such that 2 ≤
k ′ ≤ k − 1, no ≥-k ′-cycle exists in −→pi and let us show that no cycle
of length k exists.
To exhibit a contradiction we will need to use the following
necessary condition [7]: to be single-peaked, a proleU needs to be
worst-restricted, i.e. for any triple of objects O = (oa ,ob ,oc ) ∈ O3
there always exists an object oj ∈ O such that there exists an agent
i with oj < argminok ∈O w(i,ok ) [36].
Because µ is a ≥-k-cycle, for all agent µi , µ1 involved in µ
we have oi−1 µi oi and ok µ1 o1. As no ≥-k ′-cycle exists, with
k ′ < k , for all agents µi , µ1 involved in µ and for all objects ol in
µ, ol , oi and ol , oi−1, we have oi µi ol . Moreover for all objects
ol in µ, ol , o1 and ol , ok , we have o1 µ1 ol . If the preferences
do not respect these conditions, a ≥-k ′-cycle exists with k ′ < k .
Because the prole is worst-restricted, for all the triple of objects
O in {o1, . . . ,ok }, at most two resources of O can be ranked last
among O by the agents. Let us call ow one of these objects ranked
last by agent µl and held by agent µw . Thanks to the previous
paragraph, we know that best(O, µw ) = ow−1 and so, because her
preferences are single-peaked, µw puts ow+1 in last position among
ow−1,ow ,ow+1. The same holds for agent µw+1 who ranks ow−1
in last position among ow−1,ow ,ow+1 (because top(µw+1) = ow ).
Therefore when we focus only on the three objects ow−1,ow ,ow+1,
each of them is ranked last among them by one agent which violates
the condition of worst-restriction. The contradiction is set, no ≥-k-
cycle exists in −→pi . 
Together with Proposition 4, Proposition 8 gives another inter-
pretation of sequenceability in this domain:
Corollary 6.1. If preferences are single-peaked (and additive),
then an allocation −→pi is sequenceable if and only if it is swap-optimal.
Proposition 1 by Damamme et al. [20] is much stronger than our
Corollary 6.1, as it shows that swap-optimality is actually equiva-
lent to Pareto-eciency when each agent receives a single resource.
Unfortunately, in our context where each agent can receive several
items, this is no longer the case, as the following example shows:
Example 6.2. Consider this instance, single-peaked with respect
to 1 . · · · . 6: ©­«
† 1 2 3 4 5 †6
1 †3 4 5 †6 2
1 2 †4 †5 6 3
ª®¬
The circled allocation is swap-optimal, but Pareto-dominated by
the allocation marked with dags.
7 ENVY-FREENESS AND CEEI
The use of sequences of sincere choices can also be motivated by
the search for a fair allocation protocol. Here, we will focus on two
fairness properties and analyze their link with sequenceability.
The rst of these notions is probably one of the most prominent
fairness properties: envy-freeness [25, 38, 39].
Denition 7.1. Let I be an add-MARA instance and −→pi be an
allocation. −→pi veries the envy-freeness property (or is simply envy-
free), when ui (pii ) ≥ ui (pij ), ∀(i, j) ∈ N2 (no agent strictly prefers
the share of any other agent).
The notion of competitive equilibrium is an old and well-known
concept in economics [24, 40]. If equal incomes are imposed among
the stakeholders, this concept becomes the competitive equilibrium
from equal incomes [32], yielding a very strong fairness concept
that has been recently explored both in articial intelligence and
in economics [12, 19, 33].
Denition 7.2. Let I = (N ,O,w) be an add-MARA instance, −→pi
an allocation, and −→p ∈ [0, 1]m a vector of prices. A pair (−→pi ,−→p ) is
said to form a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) if
∀i ∈ N : pii ∈ argmaxpi ⊆O
{
ui (pi ) :
∑
ok ∈pi
pk ≤ 1
}
.
In other words, pii is one of the maximal shares that i can buy with
a budget of 1, given that the price of each object ok is pk .
We will say that allocation −→pi is a CEEI if there exists a vector−→p such that (−→pi ,−→p ) forms a CEEI.
As Bouveret and Lemaître [12] and Brânzei et al. [18] have shown,
with additive preferences, every CEEI allocation is envy-free. In
this section, we investigate the question of whether an envy-free
or CEEI allocation is necessarily sequenceable. For envy-freeness,
the answer is negative.
Proposition 9. There exist non-sequenceable envy-free alloca-
tions, even if the agents’ preferences are strict on shares.
Proof. A counterexample with strict preferences on shares is
given in Example 4.2 above, for which we can check that the circled
allocation −→pi is envy-free and non-sequenceable. 
Concerning CEEI, it is already well known that any CEEI alloca-
tion is Pareto-optimal (hence sequenceable) if the preferences are
strict on shares [12]. This is also a consequence of the First Welfare
Theorem introduced by Babaio et al. [5] for indivisible goods.
However, surprisingly, this result does not hold anymore if the
preferences are not strict on shares, as the following example shows:
©­«
† 2 †3 3 2
2 3 † 4 1
0 4 2 †4
ª®¬
The circled allocation is CEEI (with prices 0.5, 1, 1, 0.5) but is ordi-
nally necessary (hence also additively) dominated by the allocation
marked with †.
In spite of this negative result, we can still guarantee a certain
level of eciency for CEEI allocations:
Proposition 10. Every CEEI allocation is sequenceable.
Proof. We will show that no allocation can be at the same time
non-sequenceable and CEEI. Let −→pi be a non-sequenceable alloca-
tion. We can use the same terms and notations than in the proof of
Proposition 3, especially concerning the dominance cycle.
Let C be the set of agents concerned by the cycle. −→pi contains
the following shares:
pii = {ok } ∪ τi pii+1 = {oi } ∪ τi+1 .... pik = {ok−1} ∪ τk
whereas the allocation −→pi ′ that dominates it, contains:
pi ′i = {oi } ∪ τi pi ′i+1 = {oi+1} ∪ τi+1 .... pi ′k = {ok } ∪ τk
the other shares being unchanged from −→pi to −→pi ′.
Suppose that −→pi is CEEI. This allocation must satisfy two kinds
of constraints. First, −→pi must satisfy the price constraint. If we write
p(pi ) def= ∑ok ∈pi pk , we have, ∀i ∈ C, p(pii ) ≤ 1 (1).
Next, −→pi must be optimal: every share having a higher utility for
an agent than her share in −→pi costs strictly more than 1. Provided
that ∀i ∈ C : ui (pi ′i ) > ui (pii ) (because −→pi
′ substitutes more pre-
ferred objects to less preferred objects in −→pi ), this constraint can be
written as ∀i ∈ C, p(pi ′i ) > 1 (2).
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Figure 1: Distribution of the number of allocations by pair of (eciency, fairness) criteria.
By summing equations (1) and (2), provided that all shares are
disjoint, we obtain
p(
⋃
j ∈C
pij ) ≤ |C| and p(
⋃
j ∈C
pi ′j ) > |C|
Yet,
⋃
j ∈C pij =
⋃
j ∈C pi ′j (because the allocation
−→pi ′ is obtained
from −→pi by simply swapping objects between agents in C). The two
previous equations are contradictory. 
8 EXPERIMENTS
We have exhibited in Sections 4 and 5 a “hierarchy of allocation
eciency” made of several steps: Pareto-optimal (PO), sequence-
able (Seq), {cycle-deal-optimal}, non-sequenceable (NS). A natural
question is to know, for a given instance, which proportion of alloca-
tions are located at each level of the scale. We give a rst answer by
experimentally studying the distribution of allocations between the
dierent levels. For cycle-deal optimality, we focus on the simplest
type of deals, namely, >-swap-deals. We thus have a linear scale of
eciency concepts, from the strongest to the weakest: PO→ Seq
→ Swap→ NS. We also analyze the relation between eciency
and various notions of fairness by linking this latter scale with the
6-level scale of fairness introduced by Bouveret and Lemaître [12]:
CEEI→ Envy-Freeness (EF)→ min-max share (mMS)→ propor-
tionality (PFS)→ max-min share (MMS)→ NS. We generate 50
add-MARA instances involving 3 agents-8 objects, using two dier-
ent models. For both models, a set of weights are uniformly drawn
in the interval J0, 100K and the instances are then normalized. For
the second model, these weights are reordered afterwards to make
the preferences single-peaked. For each instance, we generate all
6561 allocations, and identify for each of them the highest level
of fairness and eciency satised. The average number of alloca-
tions with min-max interval is plotted as a box for each level on a
logarithmic scale in Figure 1.
Note that some fairness and eciency tests require to solve NP-
hard or coNP-hard problems (MMS, mMS, and PO tests). These
tests are delegated to an external ILP solver. This is especially
interesting for the CEEI test which is known to be NP-hard [18],
and for which, to the best of our knowledge, no practical method
had been described before. The implementation is available as a
fully documented and tested Free Python library.5
We note several interesting facts. First, a majority of allocations
do not have any eciency nor fairness property (rst black bar on
the left). Second, the distribution of allocations on the eciency
scale seems to be related to the fairness criteria: a higher propor-
tion of swap-optimal or sequenceable allocations are found among
envy-free allocations than among allocations that do not satisfy
any fairness property, and for CEEI allocations, there are even more
Pareto-optimal allocations than just sequenceable ones. Lastly, the
absence of vertical bar for swap-optimality in the experiments
concerning single-peaked preferences conrms the results of Corol-
lary 6.1: in this context, no allocation can be swap-optimal but not
Sequenceable; hence, all the allocations that are swap-optimal are
contained in the bars concerning sequenceable or Pareto-optimal
allocations. Similarly, the absence of bars for swap-optimality and
NS (non-sequenceable) in both graphs for the CEEI case conrms
the result of Proposition 10.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that picking sequences and cycle-deals
can be reinterpreted to form a rich hierarchy of eciency concepts.
Many interesting questions remain open, such as the complexity
of computing cycle-deals or the link between eciency concepts
and social welfare. One could also think of further extending the
eciency hierarchy by studying restrictions on possible sequences
(e.g. alternating) or extending the types of deals to non-cyclic ones.
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